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An Investment Policy Analysis of the
Andean Common Market
INTRODUCTION
The economic development of the Latin American nations has
been slow.' The economies of the region have been characterized by
both an unusually heavy concentration on traditional Latin Ameri-
can exports (such as raw materials) and a dependence relationship
with more developed nations such as the United States of America
and the United Kingdom.' The political disunity of the area has
made any large scale uniform reaction to the problem of slow devel-
opment next to impossible.
3
In order to speed up economic development, the Latin Ameri-
can countries, inspired by the examples of the United States of
America and the European Economic Community,' have attempted
several schemes of economic integration. 5 It is hoped that integra-
tion will lead to a more balanced development and an independence
from foreign economies.'
The Andean Common Market (ANCOM)l is the most success-
ful of the Latin American efforts at integration.8 It was born out of
a dissatisfaction with the Latin American Free Trade Association
1. A. WARDLAW, THE ANDEAN INTEGRATION MovEmENT 3 (1973); see, Vargas-Hidalgo,
Economic Integration, Development Planning and Sovereignty: A Latin American View, 9
LAw. AMERICAS 318, 319 (1977).
2. Vargas-Hidalgo, supra note 1, at 318-20.
3. See id. at 320-21.
4. Id. at 321; D. MoRAwETz, THE ANDEAN GRoup 1 (1974). Miguel S. Wionczek has
pointed out that the goals of the Latin American advocates of economic integration are hardly
original. The newly independent British colonies in North America sought the same objec-
tives through a union of states in the eighteenth century. France and Germany made similar
moves for similar reasons in the nineteenth century. Wionczek, Introduction: Requisites for
Integration, in LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 5 (M. Wionczek ed. 1966).
5. [1978] Latin America Introduction, 3 INVESTNG, LIcENING & TRADING CONMTONS
ABROAD 1 (Bus. Int'l Corp.) (June 1978) [hereinafter cited as Latin America]; Vargas-
Hidalgo, supra note 1, at 318-19. Examples of these schemes are the Latin American Free
Trade Association (LAFTA), the Central American Common Market (CACM), the Carib-
bean Common Market (Caribcom), and the new Amazon Pact.
6. Vargas-Hidalgo, supra note 1, at 319.
7. In Spanish the group is referred to as "el Pacto Andino", "el Grupo Andino'" or "el
Arcuerdo de Cartagena" which literally translated means "the Andean Pact", "the Andean
Group", and "the Cartagena Agreement" (the agreement establishing ANCOM). In English
the group is referred to as "the Andean Group", "the Andean Pact", "the Andean Common
Market", or "ANCOM".
8. See notes 390-426 infra and accompanying text.
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(LAFTA)' and out of a desire by its original members to collectively
improve their lot within LAFTA."0 On August 16, 1966, the repre-
sentatives of Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela signed
the Declaration of Bogota" which announced the intent of the
signatory nations to form a subregional group 2 within LAFTA.'1
These nations, joined by Bolivia in 1967, planned their approach to
ANCOM by participating in a series of discussions concerning the
proposed subregional organization between June 1967 and May
1969.14 The Cartagena Agreement, 5 which officially established
ANCOM, was signed on May 26, 1969, by all the nations present at
the formation meetings except for Venezuela, which later joined the
group in 1973.1" In July of 1969, LAFTA gave its official approval."
Even with the loss of Chile in 1976," ANCOM represents a
considerable economic bloc.19 The aggregate population of ANCOM
9. LAFTA was formed in 1960 by the Montevideo Treaty. Treaty Establishing a Free
Trade Association (Montevideo Treaty), February 18, 1960, I INSTRUMENTS OF ECONOMIC INTE-
GRATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND IN THE CARIBBEAN 3; Tratado de Montevideo, February 18, 1960,
CoMPIIAcION DE DOCUMENTOS RELACIONADOS CON EL ACUERDO DE CARTAGENA 1 (1973); Tratado
de Montevideo, February 18, 1960, in [19771 J. VANEGAS, I RErIMEN DEL MERCADO ANDINO
104 [hereinafter cited as REGIMEN].
10. R. FONTAINE, THE ANDEAN PACT 11-12 (1977); A. WARDLAW, supra note 1, at 3.
11. Declaration of BogotA, August 16, 1966, I INSTRUMENTS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN
LATIN AMERICA AND IN THE CARIBBEAN 149 (1975); Declaracidn de Bogota, August 16, 1966,
COMPILACION DE DOCUMENTOS RELACIONADOS CON EL AcuERO DE CARTAGENA 25 (1973).
12. When a Latin American speaks of the "regi6n" (region), he is referring to Latin
America as a whole. When the word "subregional" is used, it simply means a subregion or
part of Latin America. However, the term does have greater significance in an economic
context. "Subregional" in an economic sense indicates that the described process is a part or
phase in the much larger process of total Latin American economic integration.
13. E. Low, Origen y Evoluci6n del Pacto Andino, in INTEORACI6N ANDiNA 15 (Funds-
ci6n Friedrich Naumann ed. 1974); D. MoRAwErz, supra note 4, at 1; E. OCAMPO, EL PAcro
Anmo o ACUERDO DE CARTAGENA 16-17 (1974); [19771 RnGIMEN, supro note 9, at No. 0001.
14. R. FONTAINE, supra note 10, at 13.
15. The Cartagena Agreement, May 26, 1969, reprinted in 8 INr'L LEGAL MATIMALs 910
(1969) [hereinafter cited as The Cartagena Agreement]. The agreement is entitled
"Agreement on Subregional Integration." However, the brief title "Cartagena Agreement" or
"el Acuerdo de Cartagena"was established as the official name. Garcia-Amador, Latin Amer-
ican Economic Integration, 2 LAW. AMERICAS 247-48 (1970). Latin American experts disagree
as to why this title was taken. Some think the name of the city of Cartagena, Colombia was
taken only because it was the site where the final agreement was worked out. EDrrORIAL GLOCA
PEDAGOCICA, DIDACTICA, I PACrO ANDINO 7 (1973). Others see a symbolic connection to the city
where Simon Bolivar's revolt against Spain started. E. OCAMPO, supra note 13, at 13. Bolivar
had been an advocate of Latin American unity.
16. R. FONTAINE, supra note 10, at 13; Latin America, supra note 5, at 6. Venezuela's
signature of the Cartagena Agreement was delayed by strong opposition from protectionist
groups in the Venezuelan private sector. Latin America, supra note 5, at 6.
17. R. FONTAINE, supra note 10, at 13.
18. See notes 395-406 infra and accompanying text.
19. See Latin America, supra note 5, at 6.
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in 1976 (excluding Chile) was 68.3 million.10 The Andean Bloc's
market size is 20.80,21 and market growth in 1977 was 36%.2 Bolivia
and Ecuador, two of the ANCOM nations, ranked third and fifth
in market growth in Latin America with 54% and 50% respectively.2
Moreover, the nations of ANCOM are important exporters of both
raw materials and agricultural products. 2' Total exports from
ANCOM to the United States totaled $6,456 million in 1977, while
total United States exports to ANCOM amounted to $5,752 mil-
lion.21
In order to tap ANCOM's extensive and expanding markets
and to exploit the resources of the subregion, foreign investors must
learn to deal with ANCOM. To successfully transact business with
ANCOM, one must have a thorough understanding of ANCOM's
structure, programs, policies, successes and failures. The balance of
this article charts the significant elements of ANCOM for the inter-
ested foreign businessman or investor and identifies potential prob-
lem areas.
I. ANCOM's INSTITUTIONS
The workings of ANCOM involve a variety of institutions. Sev-
eral were created in the Cartagena Agreement: the Commission, the
Junta, and the various advisory committees." A number of planning
20. Latin America, supra note 5, at 21. A comparison with the three other large economic
powers in the region (Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil) yields an informative result. Only Brazil
with 110.1 million has a larger population than that of ANCOM. ANCOM's population is
larger than that of Mexico (61.2 million), and Argentina (25.7 million). Id. The United
Nations population projection for ANCOM in 1990 is 101.7 million, once again the second
largest in the region (compared to Brazil's 165.8 million, Mexico's 97.6 million, and Argen-
tina's 30.2 million). Id.
21. Latin America's Markets: How They Compare in Size, Intensity, and Growth, 1977
Bus. LATIN AMERCA 411. Market size is defined in the article as "the relative size of each
national or subregional market as a percentage of the total Latin American market."
22. Id. Market growth is defined in the article as "an average of the various indicators
of percentage growth over the past five years of population, energy and steel consumption,
cement and electricity production, and passenger cars and trucks and buses in use."
23. Id.
24. Bolivia produces tin, crude petroleum, natural gas, and zinc. Colombia exports cof-
fee, fuel oil, cotton and may soon be producing uranium. Ecuador is a producer of crude
petroleum, coffee, and bananas. Peru is an exporter of copper, fish meal, zinc, and silver.
Venezuela exports petroleum, and iron ore. Mixed Outlook in Store for Key Latin American
Agricultural Exports, 1978 Bus. LA'i Am cA 83; Spanish Firm Ties Up Second Deal with
Colombia for Uranium Development, 1978 Bus. LATN AMmUCA 227.
25. ANCOM-Economic Growth Continues in All Countries But Peru, COM. AMERICA,
July 31, 1978, at 5.
26. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, ch. II.
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councils were added shortly after ANCOM came into existence."
Two new organs, the Andean Reserve Fund and a yet to be named
Andean tribunal, have recently been formed.3 Although not offi-
cially a part of the subregional organization, both the Corporaci6n
Andina de Fomento (CAF) and the occasional crisis meetings of the
foreign and economic ministers perform vital functions for
ANCOM. 29
The Commission
The Commission3O is composed of one plenipotentiary repre-
sentative from each of the Member States." There is a President
who serves for a term of one year.3 2 Meetings are held three times a
year, and special sessions may be called by the President. 3
Theoretically, the Commission is the "supreme organ" of
ANCOM, vested with extensive powers under the Cartagena Agree-
ment, including the power to hear and deal with any matter of
common interest to the Members.Y More specifically, the Commis-
sion is empowered to formulate ANCOM's general policies and to
approve rules which are indispensable to both the coordination of
the Members' development plans and the conformance of the Mem-
bers' economic policies.3 It may also propose reforms of the Carte-
gena Agreement to the Member States.3
The Commission's relationship with the Junta is precisely set
out in the Cartagena Agreement. Members of the Junta are ap-
pointed and removed by the Commission.37 The Commission issues
instructions to the Junta and may delegate any powers it so desires
to that body.3 Finally, Junta proposals are approved, vetoed or
amended by the Commission."
The will of the Commission is expressed in the form of
27. Decision 22, Third Period of Extraordinary Sessions (Nov. 14, 1970), as summarized
in E. OCAMPO, supra note 13, at 51.
28. See notes 88-103 infra and accompanying text.
29. R. FoNrMNE, supra note 10, at 26-28; A. WARDLAW, supra note 1, at 11, 37.
30. In the Spanish text, this institution is simply called "La Comisi6n" which means
"Commission".
31. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, art. 6.
32. Id. art. 9.
33. Id. art. 10.
34. Id. arts. 6-7.
35. Id. art. 7(a)-(b).
36. Id. art. 7(j).
37. Id. art. 7(c).
38. Id. art. 7(d)-(e).
39. Id. art. 7(f).
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"Decisions".'" These Decisions are reached by a rather complicated
voting system which attempts to resolve the conflict between the
Commission's power to act on subregional issues and the individual
Member governments' desire to safeguard their national sover-
eignty."
The general voting rule requires that Decisions be adopted by
an affirmative two-thirds vote, but there are broad exceptions to
this rule. 2 There is a special voting system for items contained in
"Annex I" which includes proposed amendments to the Junta's
powers, approval of modifications to the Cartagena Agreement,
approval of rules concerning the harmonization of national develop-
ment plans and economic policies, and matters involving the accel-
eration of trade liberalization.13 These business items may be ap-
proved by a two-thirds vote but only if no negative vote is cast."
Another special voting method is provided for "Annex II" items
which include: the approval of lists of products to be reserved for
inclusion in the Sectoral Programs for Industrial Development,"
special rules for determining the origin of merchandise; approval of
the Common Minimum External Tariff and the Common External
Tariff, as well as modifications of the Common External Tariff; and
the rationalization and specialization of programs not incorporated
into sectoral programs." Like the "Annex I" process, decisions on
items in "Annex II" may only be adopted by a two-thirds affirma-
tive vote with no negative vote cast.'7 If a negative vote is cast, the
proposal is returned to the Junta for reconsideration. The Junta
then has a four month period, beginning two months after the initial
vote, in which to resubmit the proposal to the Commission along
with any modifications."s The proposal then may be adopted upon
resubmission if there is a two-thirds affirmative vote and if none of
the States which initially voted in favor of the proposal casts a
negative vote.'9
A third voting system is provided for matters listed in "Annex
III" which includes any subject involving the special treatment ac-
40. Id. art. 6.
41. Id. arts. 11-12; A. WARDLAW, supra note 1, at 9.
42. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, art. 11.
43. Id. art. 11(a); A. W~ADLAw, supra note 1, at 9.
44. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, art. 11(a).
45. See notes 165-168 infra and accompanying text.
46. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, art. 11(b); A. WARDLAw, supra note 1, at
8-9.
47. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, art. 11(b).
48. Id.
49. Id.
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Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Ann.
corded Ecuador and Bolivia under the Cartagena Agreement.5 Pro-
posals involving such subjects must be approved by a two-thirds
affirmative vote so long as either Bolivia or Ecuador casts one of the
affirmative votes."
Special provisions for the appointment of Junta members are
set forth in the Cartagena Agreement.52 Junta appointments must
be unanimously approved.. However, removal is accomplished by
two-thirds affirmative vote.u
The Lima Protocol established a special voting system for the
required approvals of Sectoral Programs." A proposed Sectoral Pro-
gram is adopted if it receives a two-thirds affirmative vote with no
negative vote cast." Those proposals rejected by a negative vote are
returned to the Junta for consideration of the reasons for the nega-
tive vote or votes.5 Within one to three months of the initial vote,
the Junta may resubmit the proposal to the Commission." The
proposal is then adopted if it receives a two-thirds affirmative vote."
In practice the Commission's functions are not so impressive.
The voting system outlined above, along with the additional re-
quirement that Commission amendments to Junta proposals must
be unanimously approved, have combined to deprive the Commis-
sion of much of its ostensible power." It is much easier for the
Commission to simply adopt a Junta proposal without amendment
than to attempt the unanimous agreement needed for such amend-
ment.6 ' Moreover, the Commission cannot simply ignore Junta pro-
posals because the Cartegena Agreement specifically requires that
the Commission consider them.'2 As a result of these limitations, the
Commission usually just responds to Junta initiatives instead of
acting on its own volition.0
50. Id. art. 11(c); A. WAmLAW, supra note 1, at 9.
51. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, art. 11(c).
52. Id. art. 11(d).
53. Id.
54. Id. art. 11.
56. The Lima Protocol Amending the Cartagena Agreement on Andean Subregional
Integration, October 30, 1976, reprinted in 16 INT'L LUGAL MATERlALS 235, 238 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Lima Protocol].
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. A. WAmDLAw, supra note 1, at 9.
61. Id.
62. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, art. 12.
63. R. FoNTmiN, supra note 10, at 24. There was only one case from 1969 to 1973 in which
the Commission acted contrary to the wishes of the Junta and its technical advisers. The
[Vol. 1
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The Junta
Theoretically, the Junta is ANCOM's "technical organ" consis-
ting of three members who serve three year terms.6 ' Members may
be from any Latin American nation, including non-ANCOM na-
tions." Although practice has been at variance," the Junta members
are required by the Cartagena Agreement to act in the common
interest without being influenced by national interests. Unlike the
Commission, the Junta is a permanent body with its headquarters
in Lima, Peru.68
The Cartagena Agreement gives the Junta wide powers, but the
supervision of both the Cartagena Agreement's implementation and
the Commission's Decisions, along with the preparation and sub-
mission of proposals to the Commission are the most important."
The Junta is required to act unanimously, but alternative proposals
may be submitted to the Commission, so Junta action has not been
paralyzed by this requirement of unanimous action. 0
The Junta has proven to be much more than a mere technical
body. As mentioned above, the Commission's voting system has led
to the Commission simply adopting Junta proposals without
amendment.7' Moreover, the Commission's membership has tended
to change frequently, unlike that of the Junta whose members are
usually reappointed and are difficult to remove before the expira-
tion of their term.12 This fact, combined with the permanent nature
of the institution, has made the Junta much more of an experienced,
seasoned body than the Commission."
Junta's proposal for the Foreign Investment Code was rejected, as it appeared that the
Junta's proposal was unacceptable to all of the Member States. A. WARDLAw, Supra note 1,
at 9.
64. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, art. 13. In the performance of its duties,
the Junta is aided by a large permanent technical staff and by private advisors. Id. art. 16;
A. WARDLAW, supra note 1, at 9.
65. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, art. 14.
66. R. FONTAINE, supra note 10, at 24.
67. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, art. 14.
68. Id. art. 18; A. WARDLAW, supra note 1, at 22. The Junta address is: Junta del Acuerdo
de Cartagena, Esquina Avenidas Paseo de la Repdblica y Andrds Aramburu, Casilla 3237,
Lima, Perd, Latin America, supra note 5, at 7.
69. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, art. 15(a), (c).
70. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, art. 17; A. WARDLAw, supra note 1, at 10.
71. See notes 60-63 supra and accompanying text.
72. A. WARDLAW, supra note 1, at 10.
73. Id.
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The Advisory Committees
ANCOM has advisory committees to aid the organization in
performing its functions. The Cartagena Agreement provides for two
such committees: the Consultative Committee and the Economic-
Social Advisory Committee."
The Consultative Committee, with members drawn from the
Member States, is the organ through which the Members are to
maintain close ties with the subregional organization." Its official
duties are to advise the Junta, to collaborate with the Junta when
requested, and to analyze the Junta's proposals upon the Junta's
request.7 The opinions of the Consultative Committee members are
given in the form of reports to both the Commission and the Junta."
The Consultative Committee has not been important to date. Its
function is only advisory, and the Commission and Junta have not
been eager to request its assistance .1
8
The Economic-Social Advisory Committee is composed of three
members selected by subregional labor organizations and three
members elected by managerial bodies in the subregion.7 ' Each
member serves for a term of two years. The Economic-Social Advi-
sory Committee meets in regular session once a year, but the Com-
mission may call special sessions."
The Commission's Decision 17 sets out the Economic-Social
Advisory Committee's duties.82 The Committee is to advise the
Commission and Junta when they so request and is allowed to offer
its opinion to the Junta or Commission on any subregional issue
upon its own initiative.3
Like the Consultative Committee, the Economic-Social Ad-
visory Committee has not proven to be of great importance. The
Commission and Junta have simply not requested its advice on a
frequent basis.u During the chaotic and important first eighteen
74. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, ch. H, § C. The more accurate translation
of the Spanish is "Consultative Committee", however, it is also referred to in English as the
Advisory Committee.
75. Id. art. 19.
76. Id. art. 21.
77. Id.
78. A. WAmDLAW, supra note 1, at 10.
79. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, art. 22; A. WARIDLAw, supra note 1, at 10.
80. A. WARWtAw, supra note 1, at 10.
81. Id.
82. Decision 17, First Period of Extraordinary Sessions (April 14, 1970), as summarized
in E. OcAmpo, supra note 13, at 51.
83. A. WARDLAw, supra note 1, at 10.
84. Id. at 11.
[Vol. 1
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months of ANCOM's existence, the Commission did not request
the Committee to meet even once."
Planning Councils
Andean economic integration requires the coordination of the
Member States' development plans. After a year of operation, the
Commission decided to create a series of planning councils to aid
in this task: the official Planning Council, the Monetary and Ex-
change Council, the Financing Council, the Fiscal Policy Council,
and the Foreign Trade Council. 8'
The Andean Reserve Fund
After over two years of discussion and delay, the Andean Re-
serve Fund"7 finally began to function in July of 1978." Its official
functions are to help the Member States with their chronic balance
of payments problems, to help in the harmonization of the Mem-
bers' monetary policies, to improve the liquidity of investments
made from the Members' external reserves, and to act as guarantor
of loans made to Member States from third parties.' Unofficially,
the Fund has two other aims. First, it is hoped that the Fund will
operate to show solidarity among the Members.' 0 Second, ANCOM
officials have expressed hope that at a later time the Fund will grow
into a Latin American common fund which will be able to help the
nations of the region decrease their dependence on the International
Monetary Fund."
The Fund has a defined structure. Management of the Fund
will be handled by a board of directors composed of the Members'
central bank presidents and will be headed by an executive presi-
85. Id.
86. Decision 22, Third Period of Extraordinary Sessions (November 14, 1970), as summa-
rized in E. OCAMPO, supra note 13, at 51; Vargas-Hidalgo, supra note 1, at 336.
87. The sources mention two Spanish names for this organ: el Fondo Andino de Reservas
(literally meaning the Andean Fund of Reserves) and el Fondo Monetario Andino (literally
meaning the Andean Monetary Fund). In English it is always referred to as the Andean
Reserve Fund.
88. Andean Group's Reserve Fund Starts Operating, 6 LAT AMEmCA EcoN. REP. 217
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Andean Group's Reserve Fund]; Andean Fund Is Born, 1978 Bus.
LATmN AMEmuCA 236 [hereinafter cited as Andean Fund]; Newsbrief-Andean Group, 4 LATIN
AMERucA EcoN. REP. 33 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Newsbrief-Feb. 27, 19761; Newsbrief-
Andean Group, 4 LATI AMERICA ECON. RaP. 184 [hereinafter cited as Newsbrief-Nov. 26,
1976).
89. Andean Fund, supra note 88, at 236; Newsbrief-Nov. 26, 1976, supra note 88, at 184.
90. Andean Fund, supra note 88.
91. Andean Group's Reserve Fund, supra note 88.
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dent. An assembly whose membership is drawn from the finance
and treasury ministers of their representatives has also been pro-
vided for. 3 The Fund will be headquartered in BogotA, Colombia., '
The Fund's capital is to reach $240 million within four years.
Colombia, Peru and Venezuela are each to provide $60 million in
four yearly payments." Bolivia and Ecuador must contribute only
$30 million each.7
At this point, Peru seems to be the most likely candidate for
the first assistance to be given by the Fund." Peru will be able to
receive as much as $37.5 million to help remedy its current economic
ills."
The Andean Tribunal
An Andean tribunal ® is another recent addition to ANCOM's
organizational structure. Although the tribunal was only created in
September of 1978, it had been clear since 1973 that such a body
was necessary.10 1 Disagreements between the Members have taken
up more and more of the time of ANCOM officials, and those dis-
agreements have grown from relatively minor affairs to major and
disruptive arguments.102 The tribunal will interpret measures taken
by the officials, consider claims growing out of ANCOM agency
decisions, and settle disputes between Member States103
Meetings of the Foreign and Economic Ministers
Although the Cartagena Agreement did not provide for the
meetings of the national foreign and economic ministers, these
92. Andean Fund, supra note 88.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Andean Group's Reserve Fund, supra note 88; Andean Fund, supra note 88.
96. Andean Group's Reserve Fund, supra note 88; Andean Fund, supro note 88.
97. Andean Group's Reserve Fund, supra note 88; Andean Fund, supra note 88.
98. Andean Group's Reserve Fund, supra note 88.
99. Id.
100. Sources do not use the same terminology for the court. Some merely refer to the
court as an Andean tribunal. One source called the court the "Supreme Court of Andes
States." See notes 101 and 102.
101. Andean Justice, 2 IATIN AmmcA EcoN. Rzp. 51 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Andean
Justice]; Orrego-Bicuna and Tolosa, Latin American Economic Integration, 5 LAw. AMmuCAS
124, 126-27 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Subregional Integration Agreement 19731.
102. Andean Justice, supra note 101, at 51; Andean Pact Advances, 2 LATN AMEUCA
ECON. Rzp. 277 (1978).
103. Andean Justice, supra note 101, at 51; Andean Pact Advances, 2 LAmN AMmuCA
ECON. Rzp. 277 (1978); Organizations-Andean Pact, 1978 BULL. LGAL DEv. 182.
[Vol. 1
19781 ANCOM Investment Policy
meetings have come to play a vital role in ANCOM's operations.'1
It must be remembered that the Commission members are not of
cabinet rank.' °5 They are, therefore, limited as to their ability to
commit their governments beyond the instructions given them.'"
The foreign and economic ministers do have authority, however, to
commit their nations to a certain authorized course of ac~ion.10
Thus, when the political problems of integration have reached crisis
level, the meetings of the foreign and economic ministers, not the
Commission, have been able to work out solutions that allow mat-
ters to progress.' °0 Moreover, the Commission's national representa-
tives usually follow decisions reached at these meetings if their for-
eign or economic ministers concur.' °9
11. THE ANDEAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
The Andean Development Corporation (CAF)110 is not a true
part of ANCOM.'" However, the Andean nations realized at an
early stage in ANCOM's development that a reliable source of fi-
nancing for the various ANCOM and Member projects would have
to be established."' Consequently, months before the Cartagena
Agreement was approved, the Andean nations signed the Agreement
Establishing The Andean Development Corporation (CAF Agree-
ment)." The CAF's purposes and functions are set forth in the CAF
104. R. FoNrAINE, supra note 10, at 24-25; A. WARDLAW, supra note 1, at 11.
105. R. FONTAINE, supra note 10, at 25; A. WARDLAw, supra note 1, at 11.
106. A. WAmLAw, supra note 1, at 11.
107. Id.
108. Id. The crisis-solving nature of these meetings can be illustrated by examples. The
foreign ministers first met on November 22-24, 1969, in order to start ANCOM's actual
operation. Basic issues (such as the designation of Lima as the Junta's seat, the composition
of the Junta, and the ambassador status of Junta members) were settled. On July 30-31, 1970,
the foreign and economic ministers met to discuss foreign investment policy and Venezuela's
admission to ANCOM. The foreign ministers met once again on March 12, 19' , to endorse
the controversial Foreign Investment Code. Id. The economic ministers convened once again
in emergency session on April 10, 1976, which resulted in compromise amendments to the
Cartagena Agreement (Decision 101). Eleventh Hour Rescue for Andean Group, 4 LATIN
AMERICA ECON. REP. 61 (1976). In June-July 1976, the foreign ministers met to discuss the
worsening problems with Decision 24. News Roundup-Andean Group, 4 LATIN AMERICA
ECON. REP. 100 (1976).
109. A. WmAW supra note 1, at 11.
110. The Spanish term for this organ is Corporaci6n Andina de Fomento which is abbre-
viated as "CAF." R. FoNrrINE, supra note 10, at 27. In English it is usually referred to as
"the Andean Development Corporation" or "the Andean Development Bank." The CAF was
established in Caracas, Venezuela. Latin America, supra note 5, at 11. Further, Caracas is
CAF's headquarters. R. FoNrAIN, supra note 10, at 26.
111. R. FONTrAINE, supra note 10, at 26.
112. A. WARDLAw, supra note 1, at 37.
113. Agreement Establishing the Andean Development Corporation, February 7, 1968,
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Ann.
Agreement." ' The Corporation aims to further subregional integra-
tion by encouraging the utilization of economic opportunities and
resources within the subregion."' Production and service enterprises
are to be created and existing enterprises are to be expanded and
modernized."' These goals are to be accomplished through the un-
dertaking of investment opportunity studies, the dissemination of
the results of such studies to the Members, the furnishing of techni-
cal and financial assistance for the preparation and realization of
multinational and complementary projects, the acquisition of both
foreign and domestic credit, and the granting of loans to Mem-
bers."
7
In the performance of its duties, the CAF is subject to certain
restrictions by charter."' Financing for projects involving Peru, Col-
ombia or Venezuela can only be given if those projects involve the
production of goods scarce in the subregion or if they include the
participation of more than one Member."' In contrast, the less de-
veloped nations, Bolivia and Ecuador, may be given loans for any
developmental project.1
The CAF is organized in corporate form, having officers, a
Board of Directors, and shareholders.' 2' The nature of CAF share-
holders varies according to class.'22 Series A shares may belong only
to the Member States or to a Member-designated private or public
institution; Series B may be owned by either the public or private
sectors of any ANCOM nation;121 and Series C stock may be issued
at the Board's discretion for sale to non-ANCOM investors. "A Share-
holders' regular meetings are held once a year, but special meetings
may be called.'2
The Board of Directors consists of ten Members each serving
reprinted in 8 Irr'L LGAL MATERIALS 940 (1969) [hereinafter cited as CAF Agreement];
RGIMEN, supra note 9, at 303.
114. CAF Agreement, supra note 113, arts. 3 and 4.
115. Id. art. 3.
116. Id.
117. Id. art. 4.
118. Andean Loan Body Gets New Financial Muscle, 1975 Bus. LATIN AMERICA 60, 61
[hereinafter cited as Loan Body Gets Muscle].
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. CAF Agreement, supra note 113, chs. ll-V; A. WADsLAw, supra note 1, at 37-38.
122. CAF Agreement, supra note 113, ch. H; A. WARDLAW, supra note 1, at 37-38.
123. CAF Agreement, supra note 113, art. 5(a),(b).
124. Id. art. 6(c); A. WARDLAW, supra note 1, at 38. The purpose of the Series "C" share
was to raise the money necessary to complete the original capitalization, over and above
Member contributions.
125. CAF Agreement, supra note 113, arts. 11-12.
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three year terms. " The Series A and Series B shareholders each
elect five Directors.'2 The Board chooses officers and both deter-
mines and administers the CAF's policies.
28
The Executive President, elected by the Board for a term of five
years,'12 is the most important officer. He is the CAF's legal repre-
sentative who has the power to directly manage and administer the
CAF.'30 Although he may not vote, he does have the right to partici-
pate in Board meetings.'13
The authorized capital of CAF is now $400 million.' The orig-
inal $100 million was contributed by the Member States. 33 The
remaining capital has been received from different sources. Techni-
cal assistance grants have been given to the CAF by the UN Devel-
opment Program ($367,500), the Canadian Government ($500,000),
and the Finnish Government ($256,000). 13 Loan capital has been
obtained from the International Development Bank ($5.4 million),
the United States Agency for International Development ($15 mil-
lion), the Brazilian Government ($6 million), the Mexican Govern-
ment ($5 million), the Export-Import Bank of Japan ($10 million),
and the Finnish Government (in the form of a 1 million Finnish
mark credit). 3- It should be noted that foreign capital participation
is encouraged by CAF.1'3
The CAF's performance to date has been somewhat disappoint-
ing but some of the blame for its failures may be placed elsewhere.
The financing of the sectoral programs was designated as one of the
CAF's prime goals, but -only three of these programs have been
approved by the Commission.'" Moreover, until 1975 the CAF had
126. Id. art. 23.
127. Id. art. 24. The text of the agreement calls for six directors elected by the Series A
Shareholders, each Member nation appointing a director. Since Chile's withdrawal in 1977,
there are only five directors. See Chile Withdraws from the Andean Development
Corporation, 16 rr'L LEAL MATmULS 1585 (1977).
128. CAF Agreement, supra note 113, art. 27.
129. Id. arts. 27, 32.
130. Id. art. 31.
131. Id. art. 31(c).
132. Loan Body Gets Muscle, supra note 118, at 60.
133. CAF Agreement, supra note 113, ch. 1I. Each Member purchased one share of Class
"A" stock at $1 million each. In addition, each Member purchased a number of Class "B"
shares valued at $5,000 each. Colombia, Chile, Peru and Venezuela took 900 shares each;
Bolivia and Ecuador, 100 shares. Id. arts. 5-6; A. WaRDLrw, supra note 1, at 37.
134. Loan Body Gets Muscle, supra note 118, at 61.
135. Id.; News Roundup-Andean Group, 3 LAI AMEmCA ECON. REP. 104 (1975);
Newsbrief-Andean Group, 3 LATIN AMmuCA ECON. REP. 145 (1975).
136. R. ForrAiN, supra note 10, at 26.
137. See notes 179-180 & 416-19 and accompanying text.
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an authorized capital of only $100 million. 38 This relatively small
sum was inadequate for financing anything but the smaller pro-
jects.1
3 '
CAF must, however, bear much of the blame. It has shown a
lack of courage by avoiding any actions which would even arguably
alienate any of the Members."' In addition, a lack of proper plan-
ning has at times been demonstrated. The subregion desperately
needs a boost in its physical integration (intra-regional communica-
tions and transportation),"' yet CAF's plans for physical integration
projects have generated little or no enthusiasm.
2
The CAF's failures, however, should not be overstated. Like
other aspects of the Andean economic integration scheme, the aims
of the CAF were rather optimistic and ambitious. It is, therefore, not
surprising that the CAF has failed to live up to these expectations."'
Within its limits, the CAF has done some admirable work in financ-
ing small to medium projects.'"
III. ANCOM's Pim
ANCOM has a comprehensive plan for facilitating subregional
integration.' This program may be broken down into four basic
parts: the common external tariff (CET),'4 trade liberalization,
Sectoral Programs of Industrial Development,"17 and the control of
foreign investment within the subregion.
138. Loan Body Gets Muscle, supra note 118, at 60; A. WARDLAw, supra note 1, at 37-
38.
139. See R. FosmrAn, supra note 10, at 27. After the capital was raised to $400 million,
the CAF contributed $124 million to construct only one road. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. For instance, in 1974, the CAF offered to buy a number of Boeing airliners to
rent to Member nations. By 1977 only one had been rented. Id.
143. See id. at 27-28.
144. Some figures will illustrate the CAF's work. In 1974, the CAF loaned $100 million
for 73 projects within the Member States. News Roundup-Andean Group, 3 LATIn AMERCA
ECON. REP. 84 (1975). The two biggest recipients were Peru ($27 million) and Chile ($23
million). Id. In 1975, Chile received $5 million, loaned to the Central Bank of Chile to
stimulate Chilean exports; Bolivia received a total of $35.7 million for various development
projects. Newsbriefs-Andean Group, 3 LAIIN AmEcA EcoN. Rz'. 184 (1975). In 1978, CAF
plans to loan $71 million to the Members. Colombia is to receive $38.5 million for an oil
refinery. Ecuador has been assigned $9.5 million for a textile company, timber mill, and
palm oil project. Peru is to receive a total of $23 million to promote economic integration
and non-traditional exports. Briefcase-Andean Group, 6 LATn AMERCA ECON. REP. 103
(1978).
145. R. FomreNTi, supra note 10, at 14-15.
146. See notes 148-56 infra and accompanying text.
147. See notes 179-98 infra and accompanying text.
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Common External Tariff
In the Cartagena Agreement, the Member States pledged the
development of the CET in order to produce subregional develop-
ment."18 This CET will apply to imports from all non-ANCOM na-
tions, even those belonging to LAFTA."'
The establishment of the CET is a two step process. 15 The first
step began in 1970 when the Commission established minimum
common external tariffs for certain broad classes of goods.'' From
1971 until the end of 1975, Members who had lower tariffs raised
them in yearly installments to at least the minimum stated level. 52
The second stage is now in progress. 53 The final CET levels are to
be determined by the end of 1979 and are to be complied with over
a period lasting from 1980 to 1983 for Colombia, Peru, and Vene-
zuela, and from 1980 to 1989 for Bolivia and Ecuador.'-4 These CET
levels will be expressed in terms of a minimum and maximum.-rs A
tariff within the range allowed by the minimum and maximum will
be deemed in compliance.IN
Trade Liberalization
The liberalization of intra-ANCOM trade is a vital part of the
ANCOM plan, designed to deal with 'both non-tariff barriers
(NTBs)'57 and tariff barriers.55
Under the Cartagena Agreement, the NTBs were to be removed
at the end of 1970,1 so obviously all Member States already should
be in compliance. However, in practice the NTBs still pose a prob-
148. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, ch. VI.
149. Id. art. 62; Latin America, supra note 5, at 12.
150. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, ch. VI; Latin America, supra note 5, at
12.
151. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, art. 63; Latin America, supra note 5, at
12.
152. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, art. 64; Latin America, supra note 5, at
12.
153. Latin America, supra note 5, at 12.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 41-43; R. FoNTAMnE, supra note 10,
at 15; Latin America, supra note 5, at 12. Non-tariff barriers include such things as prior
deposit requirements, import licenses and the manipulation of quotas. R. Forrsnlz, supra
note 10, at 15.
158. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, ch. V; R. FoNTAImN, supra note 10, at 15;
Latin America, supra note 5, at 11.
159. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, art. 46; Latin America, supra note 5, at
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lem in some ANCOM States.'"0
The elimination of tariff barriers is a very complicated process
under the Cartagena Agreement, as amended by the Lima Proto-
col."' The process involves a number of goods lists established by
the Commission pursuant to Junta proposals."12 One of these lists
was incorporated by reference from the previously established Com-
mon Schedule of LAFTA."3 These items started to be freely traded
among ANCOM nations in April of 1970."1'
Another products list includes items which the Commission has
marked for possible inclusion in the Sectoral Programs for Indus-
trial Development (SPID) which seek to identify heavy industries
important to the subregion and to assign components thereof to the
individual members.'" Items will remain on this list until they have
been included in a SPID or dropped from the list.'" Those items
dropped from the list which are produced in the subregion will then
be subject to the automatic or progressive tariff cutting program
discussed below."' Those goods dropped which are not produced in
the region will be subject to immediate trade liberalization.'"
Two of the lists were constructed specifically to give preference
to underdeveloped Bolivia and Ecuador.'" The first includes goods
not produced in the region but reserved for possible production in
Bolivia or Ecuador.7 0 The second is a list of goods for which Bolivia
160. Latin America, supra note 5, at 12.
161. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, ch. V; Lima Protocol, supra note 54, art.
1; P Fow rnz, supra note 10, at 15.
162. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 46-60; R. FoNrAINI, supra note 10,
at 15-16; A. WmwLAw, supra note 1, at 17-18.
163. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, art. 49; A. WArDLAw, supra note 1, at 17.
At present there are 175 items on the only installment of the LAFrA Common List success-
fully negotiated. Latin America, supra note 5, at 4. Some sample items on the LAFTA list
which are also important in ANCOM are bananas, cacoa beans, cacoa powder, unroasted
coffee, copper ore, refined copper, long-staple cotton, fish meal, and semi-refined fish oil. II
RhGIMM, supra note 9, at 332; A. WmtI.AW, supra note 1, at 44.
164. A. WARMiAw, supra, note 1, at 17.
165. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, art. 47-48; R. ForrA , supra note 10,
at 16; Latin America, supra note 5, at 11; A. WARwLAW, supra note 1, at 20. Some 300 items
have been placed on this list.
166. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, art. 47-48; A. WARDLAW, supra note 1, at
20.
167. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, art. 53(b); A. WADLAw, supra note 1, at
20.
168. The Cartagena Agreement, art. 53(a); A. WARDLAw, supra note 1, at 20.
169. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 50-51; A. WARDLAW, supra note 1,
at 18.
170. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 50-51; A. WARDLAW, supra note 1,
at 18.
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and Ecuador obtained duty-free access to Colombia, Peru and Ven-
ezuela.'
Those goods not produced in the region and not reserved for
Bolivia and Ecuador are on a special list.'" Free trade in these items
started in February of 1971.13
Under the Cartagena Agreement, each Member State was al-
lowed to claim exceptions from the trade liberalization program."'
Goods on the exception list will not be freely traded until 1988 for
Colombia, Peru and Venezuela and 1993 for Bolivia and Ecuador. 75
Items not included on the above-mentioned lists come within
the progressive or automatic tariff cutting program under which the
tariffs on such products are gradually reduced until totally elimi-
nated. 76 Colombia, Peru and Venezuela must complete the process
by 1983; Ecuador and Bolivia by 1988.'7 The Members have been
faithful to this program even though reductions sometimes are made
several months after the scheduled times and local officials are
sometimes uninformed about the reductions. 78
The Sectoral Programs of Industrial Development
The Sectoral Programs of Industrial Development (SPIDs) 17'
171. A. WARnDLAw, supra note 1, at 18.
172. Id. at 17.
173. Id.
174. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, art. 55; R. ForMnx, supra note 10, at
16; Latin America, supra note 5, at 12; A. WmaDLAw, supra note 1, at 19-20. Bolivia was
allowed 350 items (plus 50 tariff subpoesitions); Colombia 250 items; Ecuador 600 items; Peru
350 items; and Venezuela 236 items. Latin America, supra note 5, at 12.
175. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, art. 55; R. FoerJx, supra note 10, at
16; Latin America, supra note 5, at 16; A. WARDLAW, supra note 1, at 19-20.
176. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, art. 52; R. FoNTA , supra note 5, at 11;
A. WARDLAw, supra note 1, at 21-22. In 1974 this program encompassed 45% of the intra-
ANCOM trade items. Latin America, supra note 1, at 11.
177. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, art. 52; Lima Protocol, supra note 54, art.
7; R. FoN 'riN, supra note 10, at 15; Latin America, supra note 5, at 11.
178. Latin America, supra note 5, at 11.
179. It should be noted that some experts believe that the idea of SPIDs can be traced
to LAFTA's complementation agreement scheme and the Central American Common Mar-
ket's integration industries concept. Furnish & Atkin, The Andean Group's Program For
Industrial Development of the Metalworking Sector: Integration With Due and Deliberate
SPID, 7 LAw. AMERwcAS 29, 37 (1975). The LAFTA complementation agreement is a vaguely
defined device by which the industrial policies of the different LAFTA nations are coordi-
nated and harmonzied. Id. at 32. Such an agreement is simply an individually negotiated
contract in which the signors agree to cut the tariffs of specific goods which will be used in
an industry. Id. at 32-33; Latin America, supra note 5, at 4. The integrated industry approach
of the Central American Common Market was essentially an import-substitution scheme in
which for ten years the duty-free importation of raw materials and intermediate goods was
allowed, and at the same time exclusive access and exclusive external tariff protection was
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were meant to provide a solution to a problem which the ANCOM
members felt was keeping the subregion economically backward.1as
The development of heavy industry was seen to be the key to ad-
vanced economic development in the Andean region, 8' yet none of
the Andean States had the minimum market size necessary to sup-
port such industry.8 2 Furthermore, none of the individual nations
had the capital to develop heavy industry by itself.' As a result,
the subregion witnessed the growth of inefficient and undercapital-
ized heavy industry projects which had little or no chance of suc-
cess.184
The SPID idea is essentially a joint planning concept whereby
existing industries are expanded, and new industries created, by
distributing the different facets of a subregion-wide industry to dif-
ferent Member States. I" The Members receive what is essentially a
rights monopoly.'"
The theory of the SPID isthat the subregion as a whole has the
market size sufficient to supply the economy of scale necessary to
support heavy industry.87 Theoretically, the economy of scale will
also allow the diversification of production and the maximum use
of the subregion's resources.'n Lower production costs and higher
investment returns are the results hoped for. 89 An equitable distri-
bution of the benefits of the heavy industrial development is one
further desired result of the SPIDs.'"
An established procedure for the creation of SPIDs is provided
in the Cartagena Agreement."' The Junta initially proposes a pro-
given to the concerned industry. Furnish & Atkin, supra, at 33. It is obviously true that the
complementation agreement and the integrated industry ideas share certain features with the
SPID concept. They are all economic coordination and development schemes. They all take
advantage of subregional or regional plar.ning. However, the SPID approach is somewhat
more ambitious. ANCOM has built upor. the sad experiences of LAFTA and the Central
American Common Market in planning the SPID program. Id. at 32-33.
180. R. FoNrAnm, supra note 10, at 16-17; Furnish & Atkin, supra note 179, at 35-36.
181. R. ForrAuN, supra note 10, at 17.
182. Id.; Furnish & Atkin, supra note 179, at 35-36.
183. R. ForAnaa, supra note 10, at 17.
184. Id.
185. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, ch. IV; Furnish & Atkin, supra note 179,
at 39-40; A. WAmmLAw, supra note 1, at 12-14.
186. Furnish & Atkin, supra note 179, at 42.
187. R. FoNrAmx, supra note 10, at 17; Furnish & Atkin, supra note 179, at 35.
188. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, art. 32; Furnish & Atkin, supra note 179,
at 36.
189. Furnish & Atkin, supra note 179, at 36.
190. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, art. 32(e).
191. Id. arts. 35-40; Furnish & Atkin, supra note 179, at 39-40; A. WARDLAW, supra note
1, at 13-14.
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gram which is then submitted to the Commission for approval.'" In
forming a proposal, the Junta is to include the product name, joint
programming plans, plans for financing the project, and the pro-
gram's time frame."' If the SPID involves existing industries, the
Junta must ration merchandise production according to the follow-
ing criteria: existing installation capacities; the technical and finan-
cial need for installation, expansion, modernization or preservation
of the plants; manpower requirements; the possibilities of agree-
ment for horizontal combination in specialization among companies
in the same industry; and the possibility of inter-enterprise coopera-
tion in trade, research and technology." ' Reports on the SPID pro-
posals must be made to the Commission at least once a year.'5
As will be discussed more fully later,"' progress on the SPID has
been slow."19 Only the petrochemical, metalworking and automotive
programs have been approved."'3
The Control of Foreign Investment
The designers of ANCOM knew that foreign investment was
vital to the economic development of the subregion, yet they were
also cognizant of its dangers."' It was felt that the subregion needed
foreign investment to supply the capital and advanced technology
which the area lacked as a whole.m However, along with the advan-
tages came the disadvantages. Foreign investors often came to dom-
inate the local economy, which not only hampered the growth of the
national private sector but also prevented the government from
fully enforcing vital economic policies."' Moreover, the need for
foreign capital and technology often resulted in competition to at-
192. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 35-37; Furnish & Atkin, supra note
179, at 39-40.
193. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, art. 37.
194. Id. arts. 36-37; A. WAmwLAw, supra note 1, at 15.
195. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, art. 39.
196. See notes 416-19 infra and accompanying text.
197. R. FomrriN, supra note 10, at 17.
198. Id.; ANCOM Sets Final Terms on Sectorial [sic] Program For Automotive
Industry, 1977 Bus. LA'nN AMECA 327.
199. Decision 24 as amended by Decisions 37, 37-A, 70, 103 and 109, Codified Text of
the Andean Foreign Investment Code, as of November 30, 1976 Preamble paras. 1-3, reprinted
in 16 INT'L L AL MATERIALS 138, 139 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Andean Foreign Investment
Code). Decision 24 was originally enacted on December 31, 1970, and is reprinted in 10 Irr'L
LEAL MATERIALS 152 (1971).
200. Id. para. 2; Zamora, Andean Common Market-Regulation of Foreign Investments:
Blueprint for the Future, 10 Ir'L LAw. 153, 154 (1976).
201. Note, Host Countries' Attitudes Toward Foreign Investment, 3 BROOKLYN J. INT'L
L. 233, 245 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Host Countries' Attitudes].
1978]
170 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Ann. [Vol. 1
tract foreign investors by offering the most advantageous terms. 202
As a result, foreign investors were allowed access to Andean markets
under conditions more favorable to them than to the host nation. "3
To insure that foreign investment served a constructive purpose
within the subregion, ANCOM foreign investment policy, repre-
sented by Decision 24, embodied certain principles. 23 ' Foreign in-
vestment was excluded from certain sectors. 20 Existing foreign-
owned enterprises within the subregion were to "fade-out" their
equity ownership to a minority level.2 New foreign investments
were also to be subject to equity restraints before being allowed to
enter the subregion.2" The use of industrial property rights was
limited,0 5 and repatriation of capital and remittance of profits were
to be strictly controlledY'
It was understood that foreign investors might be cautious
about these new restrictions.2 10 However, the numerous advantages
to ANCOM, it was felt, would ultimately compensate the investor
and thus no foreign investment would be lost."'
III. NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION AND ANCOM
ANCOM decisions are not self-executing. Decisions reached
202. R. FoNrAIN, supra note 10, at 19; Fouts, The Andean Foreign Investment Code, 10
TSx. INT'L L. J. 537, 538 (1975).
203. Zamora, supra note 200, at 154.
204. . FoNTAINE, supra note 10, at 19-20; Host Countries'Attitudes, supra note 201, at
246-48; Swan, The Andean Code: A Preliminary Appraisal, 5 LAw. AMmucAs 259, 262-64
(1973).
205. The Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 199, arts. 41-43; R. FoNTA,
supra note 10, at 19; A. WAEIWAw, supra note 1, at 31.
206. The Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 199, arts. 27-28; R. FoNrTIEss,
supra note 10, at 19; Swan, supra note 204, at 263.
207. The Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 199, art. 30; R. FornTA, supra
note 10, at 19; Swan, supra note 204, at 263.
208. The Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 199, arts. 18-26; A. WmDiAw,
supra note 1, at 32-33.
209. The Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 199, arts. 7-12; Swan, supra note
204, at 262.
210. Oliver, The Andean Foreign Investment Code: A New Phase in the Quest for Nor-
mative Order as to Direct Foreign Investment, 66 Am. J. INr'L L. 763, 769-71 (1972).
211. Id. at 769.
212. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, art. 27; see Latest ANCOM Progress
Report: Members Implement Most Rules, 1974 Bus. LATIN AMERICA 210. The weakness of the
implementation arrangement was particularly highlighted in Colombia. Some of the
ANCOM nations have implemented ANCOM Decisions by use of the Executive Decree.
Comment, The Colombian Supreme Court Decision on the Andean Foreign Investment Code
and Its Implications for the Law of Treaties, 8 J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 113, 117 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Colombian Supreme Court Decision). By this method the Member governments are
able to avoid extensive alteration of ANCOM Decisions by active legislatures. The President
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by ANCOM under the general strategy outlined above must be
implemented by the various national law-making bodies. This pro-
cess of implementation allows the different Member States to make
their own interpretations of what is supposed to be a uniform
subregion-wide policy.
The requirement of national implementation forces the inter-
ested foreign investor to be conscious of the different national atti-
tudes toward foreign investment. These attitudes are briefly out-
lined as follows.
Bolivia
Bolivia is one of the poorest and least developed nations in
ANCOM.21 1 However, it has vast reserves of untapped natural re-
sources2" and has managed to maintain stable growth for five con-
secutive years. 15 Bolivia's poverty traditionally has made Bolivia
favorably disposed toward foreign investment.2 11 Within the limits
of the ANCOM restrictions, Bolivia still views foreign investment
favorably.2 17 Although ANCOM policies are generally enforced, al-
lowable foreign investment is actively sought.2t8 Bolivia has actively
supported the easing of ANCOM restrictions.
219'
It should be noted that Bolivia recently underwent a coup, and
future Bolivian attitudes toward foreign investment are therefore
uncertain.r It seems likely, however, that the nation's poverty and
of Colombia had by executive order declared the Andean Foreign Investment Code law in
Colombia. On December 13, 1971, the Colombian Supreme Court of Justice ruled that the
President had no authority to issue such a decree. Id.; Colombia: Supreme Court Decision
Concerning Andean Investment Code, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MA MALmS 574, 583 (1972).
This decision obviously raised certain problems as to the future of subregional unity. The
Colombian Supreme Court Decision, supra, at 113. In effect, the Court had nullified the
Andean Foreign Investment Code in Colombia. Kirkwood et al., Andean Pact Constitution-
ality: A Final Word from Colombia, 5 LAw. AmmcAs 614, 615 (1975). The Colombian Con-
gress, in Law 8, in 1973 declared that ANCOM Decisions would have to be approved by
Congress. On February 27, 1975, the Supreme Court reversed its previous position and ruled
that the Colombian Congress did not have the congressional authority to require congres-
sional approval of ANCOM. Id.
213. R. FoNTAiNz, supra note 10, at 39; A. WAEDLAw, supra note 1, at 25.
214. R. FoNTAINz, supra note 10, at 41.
215. U.S. D'ARTme or COr smicz, CumRmor DEvELGPmNTs AND TRENDs iN THE AN-
DEAN COMMON MARKEr 13 (1978) [hereinafter cited as CuPMENr DEvELoPMENTs].
216. R. FONTAunE, supra note 10, at 40.
217. Survey of Investment Rules Shows Region's Practices and Points to Future Trends,
1977 Bus. LATIN AMmuCA 371, 372 [hereinafter cited as Survey).
218. CuRREN DEVELOPMms, supra note 215, at 13.
219. Id.
220. Bolivia: Caesarean Birth, 12 LATIN AME cA PoLrncAL REP. 225 (1978); Bolivia: Just
Another Coup, 12 LATIN AMERICA PoLmcAL RE'. 237 (1978).
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the wish to maintain its growth rate will combine to uphold its
favorable attitude towards foreign investment.
Colombia
Colombia is truly the giant of ANCOM. Its population accounts
for over one-third of the total within ANCOM,2'2 and its economy
is the most developed in the subregion. n Despite economic prob-
lems, Colombia has managed to maintain a GDP growth rate of over
seven percent.t m
Colombia's economic strength has allowed the government to
maintain a discriminating view of foreign investmentV" However,
this attitude differs according to the nature of the particular enter-
prise involved." s Manufacturing ventures are only selectively al-
lowed,2" but investment needed for the development of natural re-
sources is welcomed. 2m ANCOM decisions are usually strictly ap-
plied.m There is no sign of change in the near future.
Ecuador
Like Bolivia, Ecuador is a poor, underdeveloped nationY' How-
ever, again like Bolivia, it has managed to maintain a healthy
growth rate.m The Ecuadorian government views foreign invest-
ment favorably,n' and therefore ANCOM restrictions in the Foreign
Investment Code have been liberally construed and flexibly en-
forced.n
Peru
Peru is a semi-developed country, falling between the extremes
of Bolivia and Ecuador on the one hand and Colombia on the
221. R. FoNTrAa, supra note 10, at 35; Latin America, supra note 5, at 21.
222. R. FONTAuN, supra note 10, at 35.
223. See CtnRaier Dzvm. onz, supra note 215, at 217.
224. [1977] Colombia, 3 1Nvam, LIcENmsG & TRADN G CoirnoNs AsPoA 3 (Bus.
Int'l Corp.) (May 1977) [hereinafter cited as Colombia]; Survey, supra note 217, at 374.
225. Survey, supra note 217, at 374.
226. Id.
227. CuntzwT Dzvzvmorrs, supra note 215, at 18.
228. Survey, supra note 217, at 374-75.
229. R. FoNrAm, supra note 10, at 37.
230. Cutmir D~vfWPMmrs, supra note 215, at 14.
231. 119771 Ecuador, 3 INVEM o, LICzNSING & TAmNG CoNDmoNs AnRoAD 3 (Bus. Int'l
Corp.) (June 1977) [hereinafter cited as Ecuador].
232. Survey, supra note 217, at 374.
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other m The revolutionary military regime governing Peru 4 is gen-
erally favorably disposed towards foreign investment.23 It insists,
however, that such investment fit within the government's plans for
the Perfvian economy and that such investment comply with the
Peruvian government's terms.36 The regime has a somewhat anti-
capitalist orientation,m but it took a more conciliatory stance to-
wards private enterprise in 1977 when it took measures to improve
the procedures for dealing with foreign investment. 5 Local Peru-
vian investors feel that the regime now may deal more effectively
than before with foreign investors.2 The government is most favor-
ably disposed toward foreign investment in mining, petroleum,
tourism and high technology industries, and therefore investors in
these areas may receive somewhat more lenient treatment than
other investors z4
Venezuela
Venezuela, like Peru, is a semi-developed nation, but economic
growth and development have continued despite some serious eco-
nomic problems.24' Although the government of Venezuela tradi-
tionally has been very favorably disposed towards foreign invest-
ment, recently Venezuela has decided that the country does not
need such investment as much as it once did. 42 Therefore, the
government has now taken a highly selective approach to foreign
investment.2 3 Investments which supply advanced technology,
stimulate exports, locate in underdeveloped areas, or which provide
jobs for Venezuelans are the most favored. " '
233. R. FoNmINz, supra note 10, at 38 .-
234. Many of the present government's actions have been interpreted as anti-capitalist.
However, the government itself insists that its approach is neither communist nor capitalist.
119771 Peru, 3 INV"NG, LICENSING & TRADING CoNDmoNs ABROAD 2 (Bus. Int'l Corp.)
(November 1977) [hereinafter cited as Peru].
235. Id. at 3; Survey, supra note 217, at 374.
236. Peru, supra note 234, at 3.
237. Id.
238. CuRRENT DEvELOMEErs, supra note 215, at 19-20.
239. Id. at 19.
240. Survey, supra note 217, at 374.
241. CutsmEr DEVELOPMEmS, supra note 215, at 20-21; See R. FONTAINE, supra note 10,
at 33.
242. 119771 Venezuela, 3 INVESTING, LICENSING & TRADING CoNDmoNs ABRoAD 3 (Bus.
Int'l Corp.) (July 1977) [hereinafter cited as Venezuela].
243. Id.; Survey, supra note 217, at 374.
244. Survey, supra note 217, at 374.
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V. ANCOM DECISIONS AFFECTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN ANCOM
NATIONS
State Role in Industry
Notwithstanding the fact that the state has historically played
a significant role in the economies of the ANCOM nations, ANCOM
has no definite policy towards the state's role in economic opera-
tions.2s Decision No. 47 of the ANCOM Commission does provide,
however, that a business entity with no less than 30% state equity
ownership and with absolute veto power2" vested in the state part-
ner is a "mixed" enterprise. A As will be more fully discussed later,
this "mixed company" status allows such a firm to participate fully
in ANCOM tariff benefits.2 8 Foreign investors have used this
loophole24 in order to take advantage of ANCOM tariff provisions
while retaining majority control.
It should be noted that the governments of certain ANCOM
nations do play significant roles in ANCOM-oriented industry.2W In
Bolivia, the pre-coup government announced that state-owned com-
panies would conduct business operations, either alone or jointly,
with private investors. "51 There has been no indication of what the
post-coup government's position will be. The Peruvian government
has already participated in joint ventures with foreign investors3"
The Venezuelan government is an active participant in industry
through state-owned companies which have taken part in many
joint ventures with foreign investors.2"
245. Latin America, supra note 5, at 7.
246. The Spanish text used the term "capacidad determinante" which loosely translated
means "determining capacity". See Decision 47, Regulations Concerning State Participation
in Mixed Companies, December 9-18, 1971, art. 1, reprinted in 11 Ier'L L AL MArLuA 373
(1972) [hereinafter referred to as Decision 47). The decision itself defines this as "a require-
ment that the representatives of the state concur in the fundamental decisions for the carry-
ing on of the enterprise." Id.
247. Id.
248. The Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 199, art. 27.
249. Bayer of West Germany sold 30% of its Peruvian operation to the state-owned Banco
Industrial and Corporaci6n Financiers de Desarrollo. Latin America, supra note 5, at 7.
250. Latin America, supra note 5, at 7. Such cooperation appears likely. Under the
metalworking program, Bolivia is to construct petroleum-well Christmas trees. The State oil
company, YPFB, has been placed in charge of production. The armed force's Corporaci6n de
las Fuerzas Armadas has been made responsible for construction of the items given Bolivia
in the automotive program. Id. at 7-8. Both state-owned companies will negotiate with private
investors for private participation in construction of their assigned products.
251. Latin America, supra note 5, at 7.
252. Id. at 7. The Bayer, Massey-Ferguson and Volvo-Perkins ventures are partially
owned by the Peruvian government. Peru, supra note 238, at 5.
253. [19771 Venezuela, supra note 242, at 5. The state-owned Corporaci6n Venezolana
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Nationalization
ANCOM presently has no unified approach towards nationali-
zation.LA There had been guarantees against expropriation in the
original draft of the foreign investment rules.2 5 However, those
guarantees did not survive through the final draft.
25
1
The absence of an ANCOM-wide nationalization policy re-
quires the foreign investor to look at the individual nation's policies.
It is difficult to predict what the situation will be in Bolivia because
no policy has been announced by the new government. However, the
most likely Bolivian approach will be to make guarantees against
expropriation to foreign investors in order to attract the foreign
capital and technology that both the private investors and the gov-
ernment hope will come to Bolivia.
The Colombian Constitution guarantees that any nationaliza-
tion requires court action and full compensation. 257 The one major
example of expropriation occurred when foreign-owned oil-refining
facilities in Colombia were nationalized with compensation.2
In Ecuador, there have been few cases of nationalization since
the Velasco government fell in 1972.25 Those nationalizations which
did occur resulted from impropriety by the foreign investors in ac-
quiring the investment or from investment in the oil industry where
Ecuadorian national priorities are seen to predominate.m All of
these nationalizations have been compensated.
26'
In Peru, there is no policy of large scale expropriation, but there
have been a few nationalizations with compensation.2 2 These na-
de Guayana joined Reynolds in an aluminum reduction venture (Aluminio del Caroni). The
state-owned Instituto Venezolano de Petroquimica has participated in joint ventures with
such companies as Phillips Petroleum, Shell, Goodrich Chemical, Sherwin-Williams,
Pechiney-Ugine-Kuhlmann, Transammonia, and Dart Industries. Id.
254. Latin America, supra note 5, at 8.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. CONSTITUCiON POLITICA DE COLOMBIA art. 30 (Colombia); Colombia, supra note 228,
at 6. It should be noted, however, that Article 30 states that expropriations may be uncom-
pensated for reasons of equity if both the Senate and House of Representatives by majority
vote for such a measure.
258. A small joint venture by Mobile Oil and Texaco was bought by the government.
Compensation negotiations are still in progress. Colombia, supra note 224, at 6.
259. Ecuador, supra note 231, at 4-5.
260. Id. at 4.
261. Id. at 5.
262. Latin America, supra note 5, at 6. The present government, which took power in
April, 1975, has nationalized Gulf Oil's Peruvian propery and the Marcona Mining facilities.
Papeles Peruanos de Pucallpa and Quimica del Pacifico also were affected by Peruvian
government nationalization moves. Id.. The Compensation for the Marcona Mining Company
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tionalizations have been carried out under the guarantees in Peru-
vian law which require that expropriations be approved by the
Council of Ministers and that reasonable compensation be pro-
vided. " 3 It is important to note that in cases where nationalization
has proven disastrous, the present government has returned the
expropriated property.'"
In Venezuela, nationalizations have occurred only in the oil
sector under an oil nationalization bill introduced by President
Perez and passed by the Venezuelan Congress in 1973.265 Compensa-
tion has been given in these cases based on net book value. Na-
tionalizations in other sectors seem unlikely.27
Foreign Investment Exclusions
Under the Foreign Investment Code, foreign investment is not
permitted in public services,' insurance, commercial banking,
other financial institutions, domestic transportation, advertising,
commercial radio stations, television stations, newspapers, maga-
zines, or any enterprise involving domestic marketing of products.26'
However, Member States are given discretion to permit investment
in these areas when special circumstances exist." s Moreover, the
Members may exclude foreign investment from other business sec-
tors which they consider to be "adequately covered by existing en-
terprises." '
Bolivia has generally enacted the ANCOM restrictions, but it
property had to be settled by diplomatic agreement. Agreement on Compensation for Nation-
alized Assets of the Marcona Mining Company, September 22, 1976, Peru-United States,
T.I.A.S. No. 8417, reprinted in 15 INr'L L AL lRIAIuS 1100 (1976). The agreed upon
compenasation was $61,440,000. Id. art. 1.
263. Latin America, supra note 5, at 6.
264. Id. Return to private hands has occurred in the cases of a local foundry and the
anchovy fishing fleet. Id.
265. Venezuela, supra note 242, at 5; Law on the Nationalization of the Petroleum
Industry, August 29, 1975, reprinted in 14 ITL LzGAL MATmuALs 1492 (1975).
266. Venezuela, supra note 242, at 5.
267. Id.
268. "Public services" are defined as those that provide drinking water, sewers, electric
power, electric lighting, cleaning, sanitation, telephone service, postal and telecommuni-
cations services. The Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 199, art. 41.
269. The Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 199, arts. 41-43; Latin America,
supra note 5, at 8; Survey, supra note 217, at 372; CuRREMNr DmVLOPMENMS, supra note 215,
at 11.
270. The Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 199, art. 44. "Special circumstan-
ces" are not defined in Article 44. Their existence is in the sole discretion of the Members.
271. Id. art. 3.
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has taken advantage of the special circumstances provision,"2 and
therefore commercial banks in Bolivia may be foreign-owned. "
Colombia also has largely followed the ANCOM restrictions."'
Foreign investment is allowed, however, in domestic heavy trans-
portation, tourism and domestic marketing." Foreign investment
also is allowed in the exploration, exploitation, and processing of
natural resources such as forestry, hydrocarbons, mining, and petro-
leum."' Ecuador once enforced the ANCOM restrictions loosely, but
this policy was reversed in 1975."7 Foreign investment is still al-
lowed in domestic marketing and construction.27
Peru has not only followed the ANCOM restrictions but has
added other areas of exclusion as well.' The marketing of coffee,
cotton, oil, imported foods, and copper by-products are disallowed
to foreign investors.s" Moreover, the basic industries of iron, steel,
nonferrous metal, fertilizer, cement, paper, oil refining, and fish-
meal have been placed off limits for foreign investment and have
been reserved for government investment.nl
In Venezuela the government has by-and-large enacted the
ANCOM limitations on foreign investment.2 However, natural gas,
oil, iron ore, and other natural resource industries have been desig-
nated as areas from which foreign investment is excluded.2 0 Foreign
investors may participate in public services, certain professional
services, mass media, and domestic marketing but only to the ex-
tent of a 20% equity ownership.2" Under current insurance law,
foreign investors also may own insurance companies up to 20%.2
Ownership Restrictions
In order to qualify for ANCOM trade liberalization advantages,
272. CuRaarr DmLOPmzrs, supra note 215, at 11; Survey, supra note 217, at 373.
273. Survey, supra note 217, at 373.
274. Colombia, supra note 224, at 7; Survey, supra note 217, at 375.
275. Id.
276. Colombia, supra note 224, at 7.
277. Ecuador, supra note 231, at 6; Survey, supra note 221, at 375.
278. Id. Construction and domestic marketing enterprises can be no more than 20%
foreign-owned. Id.
279. Survey, supra note 217, at 375.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.; Venezuela, supra note 242, at 6.
284. Venezuelan Decree 2031, Foreign Investment Decree, February 11, 1977, art. 1,
reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MATEMALS 1531 (1977) [hereinafter Venezuelan Decree 2031];
Survey, supra note 217, at 375; Venezuela, supra note 242, at 7.
285. Venezuela, supra note 242, at 6.
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all existing and new foreign-owned companies must convert into
"national" or "mixed" companies.' " The Foreign Investment Code
defines "national companies" as those having over 80% equity own-
ership held by "national investors" with proportionate control.27 A
"mixed company" is one with 51% to 80% equity ownership by
national investors.20 A company with less than 51% national equity
ownership is classified as a "foreign company" and is, therefore,
denied participation in ANCOM trade programs. 3 ' Existing firms
must have agreed to a "fade-out" schedule by December 31, 1973.2"
New companies must agree to a fade-out schedule before any invest-
ment in that company is permitted.29' Any new or existing compa-
nies which do not qualify as national or mixed companies or which
have not filed fade-out plans to become such companies are denied
access to ANCOM trade advantages. 2
The Foreign Investment Code provides a definite schedule for
the fade-out process whereby a foreign company becomes a national
or mixed company. 3 The transformation period for "existing" for-
eign companies may not exceed 15 years in Colombia, Peru, and
Venezuela or 20 years in Bolivia and Ecuador, as measured from
January 1, 1974.29 By December 31, 1973, 15% of the capital partici-
pation must be in national hands; 45% must be national by the end
of two-thirds of the agreed upon time period for transformation; and
51% must be national by the end of that period.23 The fade-out
schedule for firms established in an ANCOM nation after July 1,
1971, also may not exceed 15 years in Colombia, Peru, and Vene-
zuela or 20 years for Bolivia and Ecuador from time of establish-
ment.2" For Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela, the fade-out agree-
ment must provide for at least 15% national participation in capital
by the time production begins; at least 30% by the end of one-third
of the agreed upon period; and at least 45% by the end of two-thirds
286. The Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 199, art. 27. If fade-out plans
have been agreed to, a firm is eligible for ANCOM trade benefits during the fade-out process.
287. Id. art. 1.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. The Andean Foreign Investment Code, supro note 199, art. 30; A. WARDLAW, Supra
note 1, at 32.
292. The Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 199, art. 27.
293. Id. arts. 28, 30.
294. Id. art. 28.
295. Id.
296. Id. art. 30. The source fails to include Venezuela, and it still mentions Chile because
it was printed prior to Chile's withdrawal.
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of that period.m" For Bolivia and Ecuador, the fade-out must pro-
vide for 5% national participation three years after production
commences; at least 10% by the end of one-third of the agreed upon
period; and 35% at the completion of two-thirds of that period.28
The 20-year periods in Bolivia and Ecuador start running two years
after production begins."'
ANCOM has developed definitive guidelines setting forth what
is to be considered "national capital." Capital invested in any
ANCOM nation by the Andean Development Corporation is consid-
ered national."' Investments made by a national investor from any
Member other than the host country is considered "subregional";
subregional investment is deemed national if the country of origin
has authorized the investment and if the investment has been sub-
mitted to the host country for prior approval.32 Capital invested by
ANCOM multinational corporations also is considered national in-
vestment. 33 Investments by international public financial entities
or foreign (non-ANCOM) governmental bodies in the form of eco-
nomic cooperation are characterized as neutral, rather than na-
tional or foreign.3"
There are some notable exceptions to the general minority for-
eign equity participation rule. First, as mentioned above, a com-
pany may qualify for mixed company status if 30% of the equity is
owned by one of the ANCOM governments and if that government
has absolute veto power.3 5 Second, for the first ten years of the
Foreign Investment Code's existence, the members may permit for-
eign investment without fade-out in basic product industries, such
as mineral exploration and production and forest exploitation, if the
investment is allowed under a concession system with the contract
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. The Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 199, art. 1; Latin America, supra
note 5, at 8-9.
301. The Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 199, art. 1; Latin America, supra
note 5, at 9.
302. The Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 199, art. 1.
303. Latin America, supra note 5, at 9. An ANCOM multinational is a corporation in
which there is equity participation from at least two ANCOM nations and there is no more
than 40/o foreign equity participation. Id.
304. The Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 199, reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 138, 155 (1977). At the time of the publication of the reprint, the article mentioned
had not been numbered. Therefore, the page where the article may be found is given in the
cite.
305. See notes 246-52 supra and accompanying text.
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not exceeding 20 years. 3*6 Third, foreign-owned business entities
with 80% of their production destined for third country markets do
not have to fade-out their foreign investment to a minority posi-
tion.3 Finally, since 1976, foreign or mixed companies which are
engaged in tourism do not have to go through the fade-out process.3
For the most part, the ANCOM members have faithfully
adopted the ANCOM rules on ownership restriction.30u However,
there are a few local peculiarities.310 In Ecuador, for example, the
fade-out schedule is highly negotiable.3 11 In Peru, one-third of the
net worth of industrial companies must eventually be held by
"workers".' 2
Registration Requirements
ANCOM does have registration requirements.3 1 Foreign inves-
tors must register all of their investments with the host nation.314
Reinvestments are treated like investments for registration pur-
poses, but also must be approved by the host country.31 However,
reinvestments of profits not exceeding 7% of invested capital may
be done without prior approval .31
Registration requirements differ somewhat from Member to
Member. In Bolivia, investment by foreigners must be registered
with the National Investment Institute. st In Colombia, National
Planning Department approval must be received for foreign invest-
306. The Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 199, art. 40; Latin America, supra
note 5, at 9.
307. The Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 199, art. 40; Latin America, supra
note 5, at 9.
308. Latin America, supra note 5, at 9.
309. Survey, supra note 217, at 372, 374.
310. Id. at 374.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. The Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 199, arts. 1, 5.
314. Id. art. 5.
315. Id. arts. 1, 5.
316. Id. art. 13.
317. CuRREr DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 215, at 13; Survey, supra note 217, at 372.
Interested foreign investors should contact:
Instituto Nacional de Inversiones
1492 Avenida Camacho
La Paz, Bolivia
and
Instituto Nacional de Financiamiento
1336 Avenida Camacho
La Paz, Bolivia
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 215, at 11.
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ment.31 1 Such investments must also register with the Exchange
Office of the Central Bank.
31
In Ecuador, new foreign investment must be registered with the
Foreign Investment Office of the Ministry of Industries, Commerce
and Integration.32 However, companies with an interest of 10% or
less in a local company need not register.
32 1'
Peruvian law requires that all foreign investment be approved
by both the Central Bank and the appropriate ministry. 32 The For-
eign Investment Commission coordinates this approval process. In
addition, the foreign investor must register incoming foreign capital
with the Central Bank.
324
In Venezuela, foreign investors must register their investments
with the Superintendency of Foreign Investment.2 5 All manufactur-
318. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 215, at 17-18; Survey, supra note 217, at 374.
Interested investors should contact:
Departmento Nacional de Planeacion
Carrera 10, No. 27-27
BOGoTA, Colombia
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 215, at 11.
The Colombian government has a set of criteria to determine if approval should be given:
the contribution to Latin American economic cooperation; the investment's net effect on
Colombia's balance of payments; the possible improvement in domestic employment that
would result; the degree of Colombian participation in management and capital; and the
technological contribution to Colombia that the investment will make. Id. at 18.
319. Survey, supra note 217, at 374. The address is:
Oficina de Cambio del Banco de la Repdblica
Carrera 5, No. 15-80
Bogota, Colombia
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 215, at 11.
320. Survey, supra note 217, at 374. Contact:
Departmento de Inversiones
Ministerio de Industrias, Comercial Integraci6n
Juan Le6n Mera y Roca esq.
Quito, Ecuador
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 215, at 374.
321. Survey, supra note 217, at 374.
322. Peru, supra note 234, at 7; Survey, supra note 217, at 374. The Ministry of Finance
is the appropriate agency for financial operations; the Ministry of Industry and Tourism for
manufacturing and tourist enterprises; and the Ministry of Mines and Energy for petroleum,
mineral and power ventures. Peru, supra note 234, at 7. Contact:
Comisi6n Nacional de Inversiones
Tecnologias Extrangieras (CONITE)
Avenida Emancipaci6n 266
Quinto Piso
Lima, Perd
323. Peru, supra note 234, at 7; Survey, supra note 217, at 374.
324. Id.
325. Survey, supra note 217, at 374.
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ing investment must also be registered with the Directorate of In-
dustry of the Development Ministry.2 6
Restrictions on Acquisitions and Takeovers
In general, foreign acquisitions or takeovers are prohibited
under the Foreign Investment Code unless certain requirements are
met.32 7 First, the local or subregional company must be on the very
verge of bankruptcy, and this determination must be verified by the
particular national agency in charge of supervising corporations.S
Second, local or subregional investors must be given a first option
to purchase.m Third, foreign investors acquiring equity in a take-
over or acquisition must agree to sell that amount of stock necessary
to make the company a national company within 15 years.3 ° It
should be noted that a foreign investor may acquire stock in mixed
companies if the purchase will increase the company's capital with-
out loss of local control.3' The ANCOM members have adopted
these rules in their entirety.m2
Remittance Limits
Under the Foreign Investment Code, annual profit remittances
are limited to 20% of the registered capital, but Members may allow
higher limits if they choose.n Any company going through the fade-
out process may repatriate the fade-out proceeds up to the initial
amount of registered and authorized capital plus the registered rein-
vestment.3m All of the ANCOM nations have enacted this provi-
sion,33 but Ecuador applies the limit very flexibly.'"
Borrowing Restrictions
The Foreign Investment Code allows foreign investors access to
326. Id.
327. The Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 199, art. 3; Survey, supra note
217, at 373.
328. The Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 199, art. 3.
329. Id. art. 3(b).
330. Id. art. 3(c).
331. Id. art. 4.
332. Survey, supra note 217, at 373-74.
333. The Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 199, art. 37; Survey, supra note
217, at 373.
334. The Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 199, art. 10; Survey, supra note
217, at 373.
335. Survey, supra note 217, at 373, 375.
336. Id. at 375.
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only short-term or medium-term credit,337 and access to that credit
is regulated by the individual Members.3 3 The effective interest
rates on parent-subsidiary loans are restricted to no more than three
percentage points above the prime interest rate in the financial
market of the lender.33' Moreover, the individual Member State
governments are allowed to set limits on foreign indebtedness.3 10
The Member States have enacted these ANCOM rules, but
there are local rules that also must be complied with. In Colombia,
all foreign loans must be registered with the Exchange Office of the
Central Bank.34 ' In Ecuador, although the ANCOM rules apply gen-
erally, the government allows somewhat greater flexibility in ob-
taining local credit. 32 However, in order to guarantee servicing at
the official exchange rate, foreign loans in Ecuador are required to
be registered with the Central Bank.3 3 In Peru, the general ANCOM
rules apply, but any foreign loan must be both registered with and
approved by the Central Bank.Y' In Venezuela, although the gov-
ernment has put no real restrictions on the accessibility to loan
funds, medium and long-term credit may be difficult to secure due
to the relative scarcity of funds. 5 Foreign loans must be both regis-
tered with and approved by the Superintendency of Foreign Invest-
ment.B
Access to Incentives
Theoretically, ANCOM has a uniform incentives policy.37 De-
cision 49 sets forth a detailed version of such a policy. 38 However,
in practice this stated policy does not reflect reality.
In Bolivia, foreign firms are eligible along with domestic firms
for tax and duty exemptions as well as land grant incentives. In
Colombia, foreign firms have equal access to incentives, but incen-
tives are granted by the National Council of Economic and Social
Policy only on a case-by-case basis. 34' The likelihood of approval
337. Latin America, supra note 5, at 11; Survey, supra note 217, at 373.
338. Survey, supra note 217, at 373.
339. Latin America, supra note 5, at 11; Survey, supra note 217, at 373.
340. Survey, supra note 217, at 373.
341. Id. at 375.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id.; Venezuela, supra note 242, at 20.
346. Survey, supra note 217, at 375.
347. Latin America, supra note 5, at 11; Survey, supra note 217, at 373.
348. Latin America, supra note 5, at 11; Survey, supra note 217, at 373.
349. Survey, supra note 217, at 373.
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varies with the particular incentive sought. In Ecuador, foreign
firms may qualify for capital, tariff, and tax incentives.5 1 However,
the availability of such incentives varies according to the business
activity and its location.ul In Peru, all foreign firms are eligible to
apply for tax, tariff, and capital incentives.'" In Venezuela, foreign
firms have equal access to tariff and tax incentives along with local
firms, but they are not eligible for capital incentives. 4
Labor Legislation
There is no ANCOM-wide labor legislation as yet. However, in
September of 1977, Andean labor ministers met in Santa Cruz,
Bolivia, to discuss possible ANCOM legislation concerning migrant
workers.3 5 This legislation would unify the procedures for obtaining
migrant worker identification papers and would guarantee free
movement of workers in border areas.3" Furthermore, the labor min-
isters held discussions in June, 1978, concerning the comprehensive
unification of the subregion's labor laws.1 7
Until such comprehensive ANCOM legislation is adopted, for-
eign investors willl have to be familiar with the national labor situa-
tion. In Colombia, unionized labor is comparatively weak. Existing
unions are organized on an industry or regional basis, and all belong
to one of the major labor confederations: the Confederaci6n de
Trabajadores de Colombia, the Confederaci6n General del Trabajo,
the Confederaci6n Sindical de Trabajadores de Colombia, and the
Uni6n de Trabajadores de Colombia.3 Strikes are prohibited only
in the public services area a
In Ecuador, approximately 200,000 people belong to one of the
labor confederations, the largest of which is the pro-communist
Confederaci6n de Trabajadores Ecuatorianos which dominates the
manufacturing sectorYR Ecuadorian legislation does guarantee the
right to strike, and despite adverse government reaction, the labor
confederations have resorted to the strike remedy with increasing
350. Latin America, supra note 5, at 17.
351. Survey, supra note 217, at 375.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Newsbriefs-Andean Pact, 5 LATIN AMERICA ECON. Rzp. 144 (1977).
356. Id.
357. Newsbriefs-Andean Pact, 6 LATIN AMERICA ECON. Rap. 168 (1978).
358. Colombia, supra note 224, at 20.
359. Id.
360. Ecuador, supra note 231, at 16.
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frequency.3"
In Peru, the labor union movement is relatively strong in com-
parison to Latin America generally with a membership of 500,000
of the nation's 5,000,000 person work force.3 2 There are six major
labor groups: the Confederaci6n General de Trabajadores del Peru
(Moscow Communist), the Confederaci6n de Trabajadores de la
Revoluci6n Peruana (government controlled), the Confederaci6n
National de Trabajadores (Christian Democrat), the Confederaci6n
de Trabajadores del Peru, the Federaci6n de Trabajadores de la
Industria Metalurgica Centromin (Trotskyist), and the Sindicato
Ulnico de Trabajadores de la Educacion Peruana (Peking commun-
ist).3u 3 A compulsory negotiation procedure for employer-employee
disputes is provided by the government.34 During economic crises
strikes have been outlawed.365
In Venezuela, more than 60% of the labor force belongs to
unions.3 1 Most unions are members of the Confederaci6n de Tra-
bajadores Venezuelanos. 361 Strikes are legal in Venezuela. 3
VI. LICENSING: PATENTS, TRADEMARK, AND THE IMPORTATION OF
TECHNOLOGY
ANCOM has enacted rules governing the importation of tech-
nology, the use of trademarks, and the use of patents.31 These rules,
as will be seen below, were an effort to prevent royalties and similar
payments from being used as a method for exacting excessive prof-
its.370
The Importation of Technology
Contracts involving the transfer of technology must be exam-
ined and approved by the appropriate authority in the Member's
government.3 7' The government authority must evaluate the
"effective contribution" of the goods which incorporate the technol-
361. Id.
362. Peru, supra note 234, at 24.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Venezuela, supra note 242, at 21.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Latin America, supra note 5, at 10.
370. Id.
371. The Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 199, art. 18.
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ogy or in some other way assess the effects of the imported technol-
ogy.3
2
The Foreign Investment Code regulates those contract clauses
which may be included in a technology importation contract.33 The
contracts are required to contain clauses identifying the terms of the
technology transfer, detailing the contractual value of each element
involved in the transfer, and determining the time period which is
involved.3 7 The Foreign Investment Code forbids the approval by a
Member of a contract containing clauses which require the recipient
nation or business enterprise to acquire from any particular source
other technologies, raw materials, capital goods or intermediate
products or to retain permanently designated personnel in exchange
for the technology transferred, which reserve the right for the trans-
feror to fix the sale or resale price of the goods utilizing the technol-
ogy, which restrict the structure or volume of production, which
establish for the transferor a full or partial purchase option, which
require the technology recipient to transfer to the technology sup-
plier the improvements or inventions resulting from the use of the
technology, or which forbid the utilization of competing technolo-
gies.
37 5
The Foreign Investment Code also regulates royalties received
for intangible technological contributions. 6 In general, such royal-
ties are allowed when authorized by a Member government
agency. 7 However, such contributions may not be used as capital
contributions3 71 Furthermore, no royalties are allowed if the contri-
bution is to a foreign enterprise from its parent company or its
affiliate.37'
Patents
Like technology transfer contracts, contracts involving the use
of patents must be examined and approved by the appropriate
Member government agency."0 Furthermore, such contracts are also
372. Id.
373. Id. arts. 19-20.
374. Id. art. 19.
375. Id. art. 20.
376. Id. art. 21.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id. art. 18. Patent applications also must be submitted to the appropriate Member
government authority. These applications must contain the name and address of the appli-
cant or inventor, the name of the invention, and the invention's purpose or object. Decision
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subject to the same restrictions as the above-discussed technology
transfer contracts. 8 ' In addition, a contract may not require pay-
ment for unused patents. " 2
Decision 85 strictly regulates what may be patented . 3 Patents
may be granted only for new inventions capable of industrial appli-
cation or for those creations which complement inventions.3 An
invention which has been made available elsewhere cannot be pat-
ented.35 Certain creations are not regarded as inventions: scientific
principles and discoveries; the discovery of existing natural matter;
therapeutic, surgical or diagnostic methods in medicine; or account-
ing, financial or commercial plans.16 Furthermore, no patents may
be given for the following: inventions contravening good morals or
public order; vegetable varieties or animal species; biological pro-
cesses; pharmaceutical products, medications or other therapeutic
substances; beverages or foods; foreign inventions which were pat-
ented in a foreign jurisdiction over one year before the local patent
request; or inventions affecting a Member's development .3
Trademark
The Foreign Investment Code also regulates trademark use.
Contracts for trademark use, like contracts for technology transfer
and patents, must be approved by the Member governments.3
Such contracts may not include clauses which prohibit or limit the
sale or exportation of products manufactured under the trademark
or similar goods in specified countries, which obligate the trademark
recipient to use equipment, intermediate goods or raw materials
which are supplied by the trademark owner or his affiliates, which
fix the sale or resale prices for goods manufactured under the trade-
mark, which obligate the recipient to pay royalties for unused trade-
marks, or which obligate the recipient to employ personnel desig-
nated by the owner.3"
85, Decision on Industrial Property, May 27-June 4, 1974, art. 11, reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 1489 (1975).
381. The Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 199, art. 20.
382. Id. art. 20(g).
383. Decision 85, Decision on Industrial Property, May 27-June 4, 1974, reprinted in 14
INT'L LEGAL MATEMALS 1489 (1975).
384. Id. art. 1.
385. Id. art. 2.
386. Id. art. 4.
387. Id. art. 5.
388. Id. The Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 199, art. 18.
389. Id. art. 25.
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VII. ANCOM-WILu IT SURVIVE?
The importance of ANCOM to the potential foreign investor
depends upon ANCOM's continued survival. Some experts and
even one Member's president have expressed doubts about
ANCOM's future.3 0 It is undoubtedly true that ANCOM has not
lived up to its original promises and goals, but since the initial plan
was very ambitious and optimistic, this fact is hardly surprising.
The ANCOM nations were simply trying to do too much in too short
a time. A brief balancing of successes and failures is provided in
order to evaluate ANCOM's probable future.
There have been undeniable failures by ANCOM. First, in its
first four years ANCOM has proven incapable of keeping peace
between its members and between itself and its members. Ecuador
was the first to create problems .39 In 1974, the Ecuadorian govern-
ment decided to enforce a four year old law banning any pharma-
ceutical imports.32 Peru and Colombia, the nations in ANCOM
with the most developed pharmaceutical industries, were under-
standably irate over this move.393 The fact that the pharmaceutical
industry was to be included in one of the SPIDs made the problem
all the more serious.
394
Chile was the next ANCOM nation to precipitate a crisis.3 5 In
July of 1974, the Chilean Junta enacted Decree-law No. 600, the new
foreign investment code for Chile.396 The new code's provisions were
far less strict than those of ANCOM's Decision 24.3" In September
of 1974, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela attacked
Decree-law 600 and declared it to be in violation of Decision 24. 318
Furthermore, the other ANCOM nations refused to change Decision
24 to meet the Chilean criticisms which had led to the enactment
of Decree-law 600. 3" By December 1974, Chile had yielded to the
390. Andean Pact: High Level Meeting, 12 LAIN AMERICA PoLmcAL RE. 245 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as High Level Meeting]; Vargas-Hidalgo, supra note 1, at 320.
391. Companies and ANCOM Members React to Ecuador's Drug Ban, 1974 Bus. LATIN
AMERICA 255.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Comment, Chile's Rejection of the Andean Common Market Regulation of Foreign
Investment, 16 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 138 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Chile's Rejection].
396. Id. at 139.
397. Id.; Andean Countries Challenge Chile's Investment Law, 1974 Bus. LATIN AMERICA
312 [hereinafter cited as Andean Countries Challenge].
398. Andean Countries Challenge, supra note 397, at 312.
399. Id.
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solid opposition of its fellow ANCOM members,' ® and the Chilean
Junta enacted Law 746, affirming Decision 24 as the law in Chile. 0'
In return, the ANCOM Junta agreed to study possible areas of
improvement in Decision 24.02 The truce did not last long. By 1976
Chile once again was complaining about Decision 24 and its lack of
revisions. 03 By September of 1976, it was clear that Chile was going
to leave ANCOM.1'0 Chile and ANCOM began drafting the with-
drawal conditions in October, 1976,05 and by August, 1977, Chile
had virtually severed its last links with ANCOM.'10
The latest ANCOM member to cause considerable problems for
the organization has been Bolivia. In late 1976, government officials
and private-sector businessmen in Bolivia began to express dissatis-
faction with the benefits Bolivia was deriving from ANCOM. 07 This
dissatisfaction reached a crisis stage in February, 1977, when
Dresser Industries of the United States pulled out of a joint venture
with certain Bolivian industries. 0 8 The venture had been started in
1974 to manufacture drill bits to be supplied to the other ANCOM
nations.'0 ' After two years of operation, the venture had not been
able to sell one drill bit."0 The situation had deteriorated so badly
that private sector leaders in Bolivia had refused to talk with
ANCOM officials who were visiting Bolivia in an attempt to shore
up support for ANCOM."' In March, 1977, the Junta suggested a
program to satisfy Bolivian complaints."2 The most controversial of
the Junta's proposals was that the other members of ANCOM move
into Bolivia any plants within their borders which produced goods
400. ANCOM Solution to Investment Code Controversy Shows Solidarity of Bloc, 1974
Bus. LATIN AMERICA 385 (hereinafter cited as ANCOM Solution].
401. Id. at 385-86; Chile's Rejection, supra note 395, at 139.
402. ANCOM Solution, supra note 400, at 386.
403. Chilean Dissension To Have Minimal Effect on ANCOM Trade Proposals, 1976
Bus. LATIN AMERICA 257; Chile and ANCOM: What Are the Issues and What Can Result, 1976
Bus. LATIN AMERICA 297.
404. ANCOM Begins Drafting Conditions for Chilean Withdrawal, 1976 Bus. LAm
AMERICA 335.
405. Id.
406. ANCOM Must Handle Another Major Problem Created by Chilean Exit, 1977 Bus.
LATIN AMERICA 30; Chile Cuts Last ANCOM Links, 1977 Bus. LA77N AMERICA 277; Chile
Withdraws from the Andean Development Corporation, 16 Ir'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1585
(1977).
407. The Pullout of Dresser From Bolivian Operation Shows Problems of ANCOM, 1977
Bus. LATIN AMERICA 57, 58.
408. Id.
409. Id. at 57.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 58.
412. ANCOM Meeting Stalled, 1977 Bus. LATIN AMERICA 131.
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allocated to Bolivia under the various SPIDs. 13 The other members
have shown little enthusiasm for this suggestion. "4 ' Moreover, Bo-
livia underwent a coup in July, 1978,"1 and it is now unclear just
what course the Bolivian problem will take.
Another major failure of ANCOM has been its delay in the
planning and implementing of the crucial SPIDs."5 According to the
original plan, all the sectoral programs were to be approved by the
end of 1975." ' By August of 1978, however, only the metalworking,
petrochemical, and automotive plans had been approved. " The
new deadline is 1980.' 
However, it has not been all failure for ANCOM. The survival
of the group so far is somewhat of an achievement in itself. ANCOM
has weathered such major crises as the withdrawal of Chile. While
other economic groups such as the Central American Common Mar-
ket and Caribcom have withered on the vine, ANCOM has contin-
ued to live.
Furthermore, one of the original goals of the organization has
been fulfilled. The group has been able to negotiate as a bloc within
LAFTA420 and consequently has much more importance within
LAFTA than they otherwise would have as individual nations.
Although there has been much inter-organization squabbling,
an Andean spirit has developed."' This emerging spirit can hardly
be called Andean patriotism, but it can be viewed as a sense of
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Bolivia: Caesarean Birth, 12 LATIN AmERCA PoLrriCA Rzp. 225 (1978); Bolivia: Just
Another Coup, 12 LATnt AMEmCA PoumcAL Rzp. 237 (1978). The current Bolivian problem
for ANCOM is being complicated by another minor crisis. Peru and Ecuador are currently
engaged in a small-scale border war on the undefined common border. Peru and Ecuador:
Another Incident, 12 LAmN AMEmmCA PoLmncAL Rp. 31 (1978).
416. R. FoNTAiNz, supra note 10, at 17.
417. The Cartagena Agreement, supra note 15, art. 47; A. WAIWLAw, supra note 1, at 13.
418. R. FoNTmNE, supra note 10, at 17; ANCOM Sets Final Terms on Sectorial [sic]
Program For Automotive Industry, 1977 Bus. LATIN AMmuCA 327.
419. Andean Pact In Fragile State of Health, 6 LATiN AMEmCA ECON. REP. 242 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Fragile State of Health]. As explained in the above article, the Lima
Protocol extended the Sectoral Program deadline to the end of 1978. Lima Protocol, supra
note 55, art. 1; Fragile State of Health, supra, at 242. However, in the Arequipa Agreement
the Members agreed to extend the deadline one to two years. Fragile State of Health, supra
at 242. However, only Ecuador has ratified the Arequipa Agreement as of August 11, 1978.
420. ANCOM's Stance in Talks May Provide Key to "New" LAFTA, 1974 Bus. LATiN
AMEMCA 217; ANCOM To Play Key Role In This Month's LAFTA Negotiai'ons, 1975 Bus.
LATIN AMmuCA 266.
421. Rosenstein-Rodan, Quo Vadis, Latin America? Reflections on Latin America
Solidarity, in LATN AMMCA'S NEw INTERNATIONALISM 310, 313 (R. Fontaine & J. Theberge
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common interest.' 2 On the more material side, Members have
scored trade gains, illustrated by the fact that intraregional trade
has gone up 457% in the 1972-1977 period.'
2 3
ANCOM has also been successful at establishing links to other
economic powers. Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina have often sent
representatives to observe the workings of ANCOM.' 4 The Euro-
pean Economic Community also has maintained relations with
ANCOM.' If ANCOM survives its current problems, this interest
could expand.
In the final analysis, ANCOM's continued life will depend upon
how the Bolivian problem is solved. It is doubtful that ANCOM
could stand the loss of another Member. Furthermore, the unex-
ploited raw materials promise to bring a wide prosperity to the
region as a whole if the organization should survive.'2 The original
reasons for forming ANCOM still exist and this fact may well keep
Bolivia from leaving. It also is true that there is no real evidence
that Bolivia would do any better outside of ANCOM than within.
The foreign investor contemplating investment within the
subregion should pay serious attention to ANCOM for a variety of
reasons. ANCOM, with its penchant for survival, is likely to
weather the present crises. Furthermore, the members of ANCOM,
through their ANCOM membership, have gained a great deal of
sophistication in dealing with foreign investment. Finally, certain
ANCOM policies are likely to continue whether ANCOM does or
not.
Gordon J. Zuiderweg*
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